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RESTITUTION OF BENEFIT CONFERRED ON AN
ILLEGAL BARGAIN IN KENTUCKY
As a general rule, a party to an illegal bargain has no
action on the agreement, or for its breach, nor is he entitled to
restitution of benefits conferred. This tendency of a court to
"leave the parties where it finds them" is said to be required by
public policy in that it will discourage illegal transactions.
Some have explained it on the theory that a court of justice
should not contaminate itself by dealing with an illegal trans-
action. In the case of restitution, which is based on equitable
principles, a further reason for the rule is sometimes found in
the fact that the plaintiff does not come into court with clean
hands. However, it is in the law of restitution that we find the
greatest number of exceptions to this general rule. It is the
purpose of this note to discuss the exceptions which have been
recognized and applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. In
many of these cases it is not entirely clear what theory the
Court had in mind, but, for the purpose of this discussion, the
cases will be grouped into four classifications which are now
generally accepted by the writers in this field.
1. PLAINTIFF NOT IN PARI DELICTO
'"here the illegal bargain involves serious moral turpi-
tude, the court will not recognize a difference in degree of guilt.
But where the bargain is malurn prohibituin only, the court may
discriminate between the major and minor offenders. In such a
case restitution of the benefit conferred in reliance on the illegal
bargain may be granted to the party who is less guilty.
The parties to an illegal transaction are said not to be in
pari delicto where fraud, duress or undue influence is practiced
by one party upon the other.' Here the court does not demand
'Sparkman et al. v. Triplett et al., 292 Ky. 569, 167 S. W. (2d)
323 (1942); Carpenter v. Arnett et al., 265 Ky. 246, 96 S. W. (2d)
693 (1936); Coffey v. Coffey, 232 Ky. 179, 22 S. W. (2d) 589 (1929);
Hargis v. Hargis, 207 Ky. 366, 269 S. W. 297 (1925); Sanford &c. v.
Reed, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 431, 85 S. W. 213 (1905); Harper v. Harper &c.
85 Ky. 160, 3 S. W. 5 (1887); Anderson's Adm'r. v. Merideth, 82 Ky.
564 (1885); see Maxey v. Payton et al., 248 Ky. 758, 765, 59 S. 'W. (2d)
1005, 1008 (1933); Fears v. United Loan and Deposit Bank et al.,
172 Ky. 255, 266, 189 S. W. 226, 231 (1916).
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that the plaintiff be innocent of all guilt. The test is whether
the parties are of equal fault.2  One may enter into a bargain
known to him to be illegal, and, yet, if it is done as a result of
duress or undue influence, he may be granted restitution of the
benefit conferred.
3
Another situation where recovery is allowed under this
theory is one in which one party is justifiably ignorant of a fact
which renders the bargain illegal.4 If he withdraws and de-
nounees the bargain upon learning of the illegality, he may
obtain restitution of any benefit conferred before he learned of
the illegality. Generally, this exception will not be applied in
favor of a party who knows the facts but who was ignorant of
the law. However, in determining the validity of a contract,
the Kentucky Court has treated a mistake of law the same as a
mistake of fact. , This idea has been carried over so as to allow
restitution to one who knew the facts but did not know the law,
from one who knew both the facts and the law.6
The parties are not deemed to be in pari delicto where the
law violated has been made for the benefit or protection of one of
them.7  Examples of this are found in the cases allowing
recovery of interest paid in excess of the rate allowed by law,
regardless of the knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the
illegality at the time the benefit was conferred.s
An analogous application of this doctrine is found in the
,as.4es involving insurance policies issued by a company not
"Rogers, et al. v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268 S .W. 799 (1925);
Breyfogle, et al. v. Bowman, 157 Ky. 62, 162 S. W. 787 (1914); San-
ford & Co. v. Reed, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 431, 85 S. W. 213 (1905).
See Scott, et al. v. O'Hara, 150 Ky. 200, 211, 150 S. W. 63, 67
(1912).
"Fears v. United Loan & Deposit Bank, et al., 172 Ky. 255, 260,
189 S. W. 226, 229 (1916).
1 Ray & Thornton v. The Bank of Kentucky, 42 Ky. (3 B. 1Von.)
510 (1843); Licktwadt v. Murphy's Adm'r., 182 Ky. 490, 206 S. W.
771 (1918).
, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Blesch & Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep.
530 (1900).
'Hardin Gray v. William Roberts, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 208
(1820).
Schwartz, et al. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 227
Ky. 823, 14 S. W. (2d) 135 (1929); Pike, Morgan & Co. v. Wathen,
25 Ky. L. Rep. 640, 76 S. W. 322 (1904); Miller's Executor v. Wilson
& Co., 3 Ky. L. Rep. 688 (1882); Hodge v. Owings, 21 Ky. (5 Mon.)
91 (1827).
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authorized to do business in the state.9 Although the statute"
provides that an agent securing a policy from such a company
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, the court has held the agent
personally liable for the amount of the policy in case the coim-
pany fails to pay,1 ' saying this result must follow unless the
insured knew of the illegality, since- the law was enacted for
the benefit of the insured. It is immaterial whether the agent
knew or did not know that the company was not properly
licensed.
12
2. Locus POENITENTIAE
Restitution is frequently granted a party to an illegal
bargain if he withdraws before the illegal purpose has been
accomplished.' 3 This exception is allowed only where the trans-
action does not involve serious moral turpitude and where the
bargain is wholly executory. 14 The reason for this exception is
founded on a theory that the withdrawal will prevent the con-
summation of the illegal act.'3 It is stated by an eminent
authority that this doctrine is flatly rejected in Kentucky.',
No cases have been found in which restitution was allowed on
this ground, but there is dictum approving the doctrine' 7 and
the cases relied on as the basis for the belief that it would not be
recognized in this state do not involve this doctrine"x or are such
that the same result would have been reached in other jurisdic-
tions.1 9 The doctrine is not applicable if the withdrawal does
not result in the frustration of the illegal purpose, as where it is
clear that the illegal part of the bargain would not have been
performed even if there had been no withdrawal by the plain-
'Simons, Trustee, et al. v. Vaughn & Blackwell, 165 Ky. 167, 176
S. W. 995 (1915).
'Ky. R. S. (1942) 296.990.
Simons, Trustee, et al. v. Vaughn & Blackwell, 165 Ky. 167,
176 S. W. 995 (1915); Preston v. Preston, 163 Ky. 565, 174 S. W. (2d)
(1915); accord Vetress v. Head & Matthews, 138 Ky. 83, 127 S. W. 523
(1910).
12 Ibid.
"S ee Martin v. Francis, et al., 173 Ky. 529, 539, 191 S. W. 259,
262 (1917).
'"Ratcliffe v. Smith, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 172 (1877).
See Mlartin v. Francis, et al., supra n. 13.
'
6
WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1912) p. 240.
"See Martin v. Francis, et al., supra n. 13.
Smith v. Richmond, 114 Ky. 303, 70 S. W. 846 (1902).
"Chapman & Wife v. Haley, 117 Ky. 1004, 80 S. W. 190 (1904).
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tiff.'" Attention should be called to the fact that a bargain may
he illelal because its performance requires the doing of an act
prohibited by law or public policy; or it may be illegal because
the making of the contract is itself prohibited by law. In the
latter case there is no place for the application of the doctrine
of locus poc nit ntiac, since the thing the law prohibits has been
done.
Since the purpose of the doctrine of locts poenitenie is to
encourage the withdrawal from illegal bargains by the parties
thereto, the question of par delichtm is not generally considered;
but when, before the drawing, subscribers to an alleged lottery
sought restitution of money paid thereon, the Kentucky Court
said that if the contract were illegal, the plaintiffs were in part
dlicto and could not recover.
2 '
3. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
The third exception, and one that has not been fully
developed1 in this jvrisdiction, is applicable to cases where the
defendant bears a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff. One
holding money or goods as the agent, bailee, or trustee of an-
other cannot avail himself of the illegality of the other's trans-
a ction as a defense.2 2  This is true where the money is placed in
the custody of the defendant for an illegal purpose by the plain-
tiff,- ' as well as where money is paid to the defendant by a third
person for the benefit of the plaintiff.
2 4
Our Court of Appeals has refused to apply this exception
in favor of a partner in an illegal business where the other
partner sought an accounting of the proceeds of the partner-
ship.'5'  Nor would they allow recovery where the illegal purpose
involved serious moral turpitude.2 6 In such cases the Court
holds the parties to be partners in crime 27 and refuses to deter-
- Ibid.
Buckeye Garment Co. v. Hieatt, et al., 177 Ky. 783, 198 S. W .21
(1917).
- Eversole v. Holiday, 131 Ky. 202, 114 S. W. 1195 (1909); Martin
v. Richardson, 94 Ky. 183, 21 S. W. 1039 (1893).
Maize v. Bradley, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 993, 64 S. W. 655 (1901).
' ldham's Trustee v. Hume, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 355 (1882).
-'"Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Respass, 112 Ky. 606, 66
S. W. 421 (1902).
- Feltner v. Feltner, 132 Ky. 705, 116 S. W. 1196 (1909).
"' Smith v. Richmond, 114 Ky. 303, 70 S. W. 846 (1902).
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mine the precise relations of the parties or to protect the fidu-
ciary relationship.
4. STATUTORY RESTITUTION
There are some situations where restitution is authorized
by statute. Where such provisions have been made, recovery
is not dependent upon the doctrines that have been considered.
Perhaps the most common illustration of such a statute is one
authorizing recovery in a wagering contract. In Kentucky the
loser may recover from the stakeholder the amount he has de-
posited if, upon being notified, he fails to comply with the notice.
This right of withdrawal is provided by statute2s and is available
until the money is actually paid to the winner.
29
After the money hs been paid to the winner, the loser or
his creditor may recover the amount so paid.30 It is not material
whether the money is paid through a stakeholder or directly to
the winner. But the court denied recovery to a faro banker,
who lost to one of the players, saying that the law was not
intended for the protection of one who engaged in gaming by
means of contrivances which are used only by those who make
gaming a business.
31
The exceptions here discussed seem largely to represent the
extent to which the courts have recognized the injustice and
hardship that result from strict adherence to the general rule
that a benefit conferred by a party to an illegal bargain may not
be recovered. This rule has been severely criticized.32 Professor
*igmore declared the whole notion radically wrong in principle
and productive of extreme injustice. He said, in part: "Where
the issue is as to the rights of two litigants, it is unscientific to
impose a penalty incidentally by depriving one of the litigants
of his admitted rights."33 Quite often, too, the penalty is dis-
proportionate to the offense.
-Ky. R. S. (1942) 372.050.
'Turner v. Thompson, 107 Ky. 647, 55 S. W. 210 (1900); Henry
H. Blackston v. Thomas A. McGill, 9 Ky. Opin. 642 (1877); Conner
v. Ragland, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 634 (1855).
Ky. R. S. (1942) 372.020.
" Brown v. Thompson, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 538 (1879).
"Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts (1891) 25 AMERICAN
LAW REVIEW 695.
Ibid at p. 712, n.
STUDENT NOTES 211
The question of how far the courts can go in abrogation of
the rule without opeing wide the gates to illegality, is difficult to
answer. There is a certain amount of persuasion in the argu-
nents usually given in support of the general rule. This atti-
tude of the courts may have some tendency toward the preven-
tion of the formation of illegal bargains, but the refusal to give
relief to the parties to such bargains does not always have the
desired effect. Too often this may lead to greater and more
vieious illegality by the wronged party in his efforts to enforce
his claim without the assistance of the law.
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